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Federal Grazing Reform
and Avoidable  Risk
Jill J. McCluskey  and Gordon C. Rausser
Recent rangeland reform attempts have increased ranchers' uncertainty of retaining
grazing permits on federal land. This uncertainty is analyzed with a model of grazing
on federal land. Ranchers facing this uncertainty will behave differently than if they
were  guaranteed the renewal  of grazing permits  at constant real grazing fees.  It
is shown that the socially optimal outcome  may be  achieved by adding avoidable
risk through targeted  rangeland  reform.  Rangeland  reform  attempts  that create
unavoidable risk can make both ranchers and environmental groups worse  off.
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Introduction
When government-owned natural resources are used by private interests, there is often
a divergence between the public and private interests. The Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), the United States Forest Service (USFS), and the National Park Service (NPS)
are responsible for managing the public lands with a multiple-use objective. Ranchers,
environmental  groups,  and  sports  enthusiasts  are  all interested in controlling  the
public lands in the West. The growing western population has aggravated this conflict.
According to Arruda and Watson, "The federal government faces a growing demand for
uses of public lands (including grazing, minerals, recreation, water, and preservation)
that outpaces  supply" (p. 422). Ranchers and miners utilize but do not own the public
lands. To ranchers,  grazing is a productive use of a natural resource. Environmental
groups, such as the National Wildlife Federation, are concerned about damage caused
by grazing. They assert that the cattle can damage wildlife and their habitat by over-
grazing  indigenous plants,  defecating  in streams,  and spreading  disease.  They  also
argue that suppression  of fire and introduction  of exotic  plants  on overgrazed  land
threaten habitats (National Wildlife Federation).  Other groups claim that overgrazing
has destroyed cultural and historical artifacts. Sports enthusiasts contend that over-
stocking prevents people from enjoying fishing, hunting, and hiking (Nelson).
Another controversial aspect of public grazing is the level of grazing fees. Congress
sets uniform grazing fees on public lands across all locations. These fees are about one-
fourth as high as grazing fees on private lands. The ranchers' perspective is that the low
grazing fees are at least partially justified  because the ranchers often maintain  and
improve  the land  (LaFrance  and Watts).  Lambert  and  Shonkwiler  show that these
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nonfee utilization costs shift the cost of using the range upward. Critics argue that the
low fees make it profitable to run cattle on marginal grazing land (Stein and Sahagun).
In addition,  the revenues  from  grazing  fees  fail  to cover  the operating  costs  of the
grazing program.
There are two principal types of possible rangeland reform: reducing the number of
permits  and increasing the grazing fees.  If rangeland  reform occurs, there  will be  a
redistribution  of wealth.  Ranchers  who  acquired  grazing  permits  at a  value that
capitalizes the expected benefits from low grazing fees will suffer large financial losses
if grazing  fees are substantially increased  or permits  are expropriated.  However,  if
the reform is targeted at the ranchers who are causing the most damage, then ranchers
who  are  not  targeted  may  actually  see  increases  in their permit  values.  Increased
tenure security for good stewards was one of the objectives of the Cooperative Manage-
ment Agreement (CMA) program;1 however, this program was struck down by a district
court.2
Researchers  hlave  argued that the stocking  rates  and  the  sustained  forage  level
desired by public-land ranchers are divergent from the rates and levels which maximize
the multiple-use criteria. Huffaker, Wilen, and Gardner propose an offsetting fee system
in  order to  align the public-land  rancher's  objective  function  with the multiple-use
objective. Egan and Watts also note that ranchers' objectives are different from those
of other would-be users of public lands. They model the conflict between ranchers and
environmentalists in their demand for public land use. As in the model presented here,
Egan and Watts' analysis considers  the utility  of environmental  groups. In contrast
to our emphasis on rangeland  reform, their  focus is on property rights. They model
the market for public lands and assert that if grazing permits were transferable, they
would go to the highest value use. Therefore, as demand for uses other than raising live-
stock increases, the number of permits used for grazing declines, but permit values do
not fall.
To analyze the effect of risk caused by rangeland reform attempts, we present a model
of grazing on federal land. The rancher creates an externality by reducing the available
forage,  which  affects  the  utility  of environmental  groups.  The  possibility  of losing
grazing permit values from rangeland reform means that the rancher will behave differ-
ently than if he/she were certain of retaining the grazing permits  at a constant real
grazing fee. We wish to show that the use of avoidable risk can bring the public and
private interests into alignment. Clarke and Reed solve a dynamic optimization problem
that maximizes utility with an avoidable risk of irreversible environmental damage. We
apply this avoidable risk approach to decision making under the uncertainty of range-
land reform and extend their results  by showing that avoidable  risk can be used to
achieve the social optimum in a model with an externality. In a sense, the avoidable risk
modifies the rancher's dynamic optimization problem so that it is incentive compatible
with the socially optimal solution. This is similar to the idea of an incentive-compatible
contract. 3
A rancher faces avoidable risk of reform if his or her actions can affect the probability
of reform occurring.  Ex ante, avoidable risk of reform can cause the entities that create
143 C.F.R. sec. 4100 (1984).
2 For a discussion of the CMA program, see Huffaker, Wilen,  and Gardner.
3 For a discussion of incentive-compatible  contracts, see Grossman and Hart.
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negative externalities, such as damage from overgrazing, to act in the public good. Our
results demonstrate that targeted grazing reform attempts have  two opposing effects
on the incentives ranchers face. The first-the discounted future effect-causes ranchers
to increase their stocking rates,  while the second-the  avoidable risk effect-causes
ranchers to decrease their stocking rates. The avoidable risk associated with reform acts
like a Pigouvian tax instrument, causing ranchers to internalize the externality costs
of overgrazing.  In  the  public  debate  over  grazing  reform,  both policy  makers  and
environmental  groups  have overlooked  the avoidable  risk  effect.  Consequently,  the
potential impacts of possible  regulatory  changes  have been  misunderstood.  If policy
makers and environmental groups were considering the avoidable risk effect of grazing
reform, then there would be  much more discussion  about targeting reform based on
damages.
Background
Collectively, the BLM,  USFS, and NPS administer  270 million acres  of public lands
where grazing permits have been issued (Egan). Grazing  on public lands was estab-
lished by the Taylor Grazing Act (TGA) of 1934.4 The TGA established a bureaucracy
(now the BLM and USFS) for deciding who grazes livestock on public lands, how many
livestock can graze,  and the grazing fees. The TGA created grazing  advisory boards,
composed  of local ranchers, that make most of the important decisions on public land
grazing management.  The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 19765 gave the
BLM permanent authority to manage lands for multiple uses and called for permanent
retention of public lands by the federal government (Arruda and Watson).
Federal  grazing permits  allow  the  permit holder  to graze  a  specified  number  of
animal units on the property for a set time period. Grazing fees are usually denominated
in animal unit months (AUMs), which is equivalent to the amount of forage required to
provide for the grazing of a mature cow with a calf for one full month. BLM permits are
renewed  every  10 years. When the permit expires, the current holder has a preferred
right of renewal.  With this right of renewal, the current holder of a permit can control
the  grazing rights  on federal lands for an indefinite  period of time. The  majority  of
permits are acquired with the purchase of property (Sunderman and Spahr). Although
the  government must  approve transfer  of grazing rights,  these transfers  are rarely
refused.6 Ranchers may choose not to exploit their leases to their fullest extent in an
attempt to avoid a political conflict with environmental groups. As a result of Rangeland
Reform '94, the BLM adopted a provision which allows ranchers to retain their permits
while temporarily discontinuing grazing to enhance conservation objectives for up to the
entire 10-year term ("BLM Grazing  . .").
Traditionally,  ranchers  controlled  public  lands,  but  alternative  uses  for  public
lands have grown in popularity and value over time. It  has been noted that the BLM
4 48 Stat. 1269; 43 U.S.C. 315.
5 43 U.S.C. §§  1701-1784 (1994).
6 For  federal grazing permits  under the current  system,  transaction  costs of permit transfers between  ranchers  and
environmental  groups may be infinite because environmental  groups cannot bid on grazing permits  and they cannot pay
ranchers not to use their grazing permits. Accordingly, the Coasian argument that a Pareto-efficient  level of environmental
damage  can be achieved given property rights and no transaction  costs is not applicable.
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historically has been a captured agency (Arruda and Watson) in the sense of Stigler, or
partially  captured  as in Peltzman.  Stigler argued  that the  self-interested  political
activity  of  the  regulated  is  generally  the  source  of  regulation,  and  therefore  the
regulatory agency may consider the regulated parties to be its constituency and become
"captured" by  them. As  a result, the regulatory  agency  often  serves  the  regulated
parties' interests. The BLM's history of grazing  advisory boards, made up entirely of
ranchers, is consistent with a captured-agency argument. If the BLM was captured or
partially captured,  then ranchers could have  influenced  the agency  to set the AUM
quotas higher than the socially optimal level. Alternatively, the increased demand for
other uses of public land may have changed the socially optimal AUM quota. Gardner
writes,  "The  primary  commodity  user groups,  grazers  and  timber harvesters, have
declined in importance whereas conservationists and recreationists have gained" (p. 12).
In recent years, there have been many attempts at rangeland reform. For example,
in 1994, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt unsuccessfully  attempted to reduce
damage from overgrazing by revoking permits on arid lands and increasing the price of
permits. Egan  and Watts  argue  that potential losses  to ranchers  through proposed
regulation  creates  uncertainty  about the stability and longevity  of income  streams,
which in turn lowers the value of grazing permits. The value of public land permits has
declined. Watts and LaFrance suggest that a possible cause is the increased uncertainty
of having desirable permits in the future. Winter and Whittaker found that the presence
of public  grazing permits  did  not affect  ranch  sales,  concluding  that the  stream  of
expected higher returns was no longer being capitalized owing to increased uncertainty
about the tenure of grazing privileges.
An economic argument is that the risk of reform will increase overgrazing because
adding exogenous uncertainty (unavoidable risk) makes expected future profits lower,
and hence the rancher will care less about the future  and the long-term state of the
resource. Increased uncertainty makes the rancher willing to trade short-term gains for
long-term reductions. Therefore, with unavoidable risk, the rancher will choose a higher
stocking rate.7 However, that argument does not present the complete picture  of the
possible effects of rangeland reform efforts because it igores  itavoidable  risk. Revoking
grazing rights on arid lands or increasing fees on arid lands creates an avoidable risk
effect. The risk of expropriation or a significant fee increase may encourage overgrazing
and thereby the aridation of  marginal lands. An across-the-board price increase provides
an unavoidable risk because it would be imposed on everyone regardless of the condition
of the land.
The potential for reform exists if the stocking rate set by the BLM is greater than the
rate that environmental  groups desire. There is a large body of literature (including
previously cited articles) documenting that environmental groups view stocking rates
as too high. For example, the National Wildlife Federation and the National Resources
Defense Council report that public grazing is hurting wildlife and soil and water quality.
Also, since  1988, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has issued several reports
claiming that public lands grazing is damaging riparian areas, deserts, and wildlife due
to management that neglects wildlife values and emphasizes commodity production (see,
7 That adding exogenous uncertainty is equivalent to an increase in the discount rate in a dynamic optimization problem
is shown to hold in our model. This result was reported by Rausser  and Freebairn and many others,  including Heal in the
case of an extractive resource.
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e.g., U.S. GAO  1988, 1991).  This potential conflict provides at least some incentive for
a rancher to graze fewer animals than permitted.
Our model  assumes that although ranchers  face an upper bound imposed by their
AUM  quotas,  they  can  choose  their  own  stocking  rates  and  modify  those rates  in
response to changes in the incentives created by reform attempts. Empirical evidence
supports the premise that ranchers  choose the number of cows  they graze  on public
lands (Johnson and Watts; Lambert and Shonkwiler; Bhattacharyya et al.). Johnson and
Watts found that the demand for public grazing AUMs is downward sloping with a price
elasticity of about -0.2.  Similarly, Lambert and Shonkwiler reported -0.25.  According
to Johnson and Watts, if fees on BLM land increase so much that the grazing permits
are negatively valued, then ranchers will either apply for nonuse or lower their stocking
levels.8 Ranchers may choose to understock their allotments in order to avoid a political
conflict with environmental  groups. In the recent past (before nonuse for conservation
purposes was allowed), ranchers were unlikely to report this decision since it could lead
to a permanent reduction in the permit level, which would lower the option value and
hence the market value of their permits. Such behavior is consistent with the findings
of Johnson  and  Watts,  which  are  based  on reported  stocking  rates  obtained  from
government documents.
The Model
The rancher is presumed to have well-defined beliefs regarding reform timing. Accord-
ingly,  we  consider  the rancher's  maximization  problem  that includes  a probability
density function which reflects beliefs relating to the timing of reform.  The resulting
exogenous uncertainty is equivalent to an increase in the discount rate in the dynamic
optimization  problem  of maximizing the rancher's profits  subject to the equation  of
motion for available forage (Rausser and Freebairn). As a result of the uncertainty, the
rancher cares less about the future and chooses higher stocking rates. Consequently, the
steady-state level of the available forage is lower than the corresponding risk-free state.
In this context, the exogenous  probability of reform can be represented as an unavoid-
able risk to the rancher.
The rancher  faces  an avoidable risk  when his/her  subjective  probability  density
function for reform is a decreasing function of available forage.  If the avoidable risk is
sufficiently  large,  the  rancher  will  choose  lower  stocking  rates.  Consequently,  the
steady-state available forage is higher than in the corresponding risk-free state. When
an environmental  externality  exists, it is  socially optimal for the rancher to reduce
the stocking rate. We show that the steady-state  available forage with avoidable risk
can be equivalent  to the socially optimal steady-state available forage in the risk-free
state.
We  develop  a model  of a rancher  whose  stocking rates  create an externality that
diminishes the available forage of federal lands in order to analyze the implications of
the  uncertainty  associated with rangeland  reform.  For  the purposes  of this model,
reform is defined as either the expropriation of grazing permits or a significant increase
of  grazing fees  so  that  it could  no  longer be  profitable  to  utilize  the permits.  For
8 Although the number of permits is set, the rancher is only charged for actual stocking.
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simplicity, we assume that reform will make the ranch worthless.9 We also assume that
the effects of the reform are irreversible. Available forage is defined as the number of
animal units per month (AUMs) that can be supported  by the forage.  The available
forage of the federal lands is viewed as a renewable resource in this context. The choice
variable in the dynamic optimization problem is the time path of the rancher's stocking
rate in AUMs, R(t)  > 0. The profit function is defined by
(1)  7z(R(t),  c(t)) = [PbW(c(t),R(t))  -Pp]R(t),
where Pb is the price of beef per pound (constant), Pp is the price of grazing permit per
head  of cattle, c(t) is the quantity of forage available,  and W(c(t), R(t)) is the average
weight per  head  of cattle,  with W,  > 0  and  WR  < 0.  Without loss  of generality,  all
other marginal  costs  are assumed to  be zero.  We  assume that dnC(R,  c)/Oc  2 0 in the
relevant range, and that the profit function is jointly concave in R(t) and c(t). The sign
of a2n(R, c)/acaR is generally indeterminate. We assume that it is not both negative and
large in absolute value. The function R(t) reduces the available forage by the quantity
-z(R(t)), where
(2)  -z(0)  = 0,  -z(R) < 0,  -z'(R) <  O,  -z"(R)  <  O.
The functional z(R(t)) is the quantity of forage harvested by grazing. The rate at which
available forage recovers  can be represented by the growth function g(c(t)), where
(3)  g(0) = 0,  g(c) > 0,  g"(c) < 0.
Although we allow forg'(c) <  0, we assume thatg'(c) 2 0 holds in the relevant range. The
equation of motion for available  forage is the sum of these two  effects (grazing  and
forage growth), i.e.,
(4)  c  = -z(R(t))  +  g(c(t)).
Stated in narrative form, the equation of motion is the change in available forage due
to grazing and forage growth.  We assume that there is a constant interest rate of r.
Finally, in the rancher's  problem,  there is an upper bound on the stocking rate, Ru,
imposed by the BLM's AUM quota.10
The Social  Optimum Without Uncertainty
The  social planner can achieve a social optimum by choosing a stocking rate, R(t), to
maximize  a function which  is a linear  combination  of the rancher's  profits  and  an
environmental group's (representative agent) utility. The environmental group's utility
9 It would not be difficult to add a  salvage value, which  could include the value of selling off the ranch or the expected
present value of profits after the reform has occurred.
10  The effectiveness of BLM enforcement of the quota is debatable.
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is a function of available forage, 11with u'(c(t)) >  0,  and u"(c(t)) <  O. In Egan and Watts'
analysis  of markets  for public land, livestock-free  public  lands are an argument  in
environmentalists'  utility functions.  The social  welfare function can be expressed  as
T  (R(t),  c(t)) +  au(c), with a >  0. A specific case of this function is a Bergson social welfare
function, where a is equal to one. In contrast, in the rancher's problem, the value of a
is  zero,  which  means  that the  rancher's  objective  function  is  the present  value  of
expected profits. We assume that the social planner cares about the long-term future,
so we use an infinite planning horizon. An infinite planning horizon also can be justified
in the rancher's  problem if the ranch and grazing permits  can be bequeathed  to the
rancher's descendants. The social planner's control problem is specified as:
(5)  max  f  e  rt(:(R(t),  c(t))  + au(c(t))) dt
R(t)  O
s.t.:  6  = -z(R(t))  +g(c(t)),
c(O)  = co.
The associated present-value  Hamiltonian is written as:
(6)  H  = e-r t((R(t),  c(t))  + au(c(t))) + h(-z(R(t))  +  g(c(t))).
The necessary conditions for optimization (assuming an interior solution) are as follows:
(7)  e -rtR(R(t),  c(t))  - AR(R(t))  = 0,
(8)  = -e-rt(Tc(R(t),c(t))  + auc(c(t)))-  g,(c(t)),
(9)  c  = -z(R(t))  g(c(t)),
and
(10)  lim e-rt X(t)c(t)  = 0.
t-oo
Differentiating (7) and substituting into (8), we get two differential equations inR(t) and
c(t) that, when set equal to zero,  describe the steady state. Assuming an equilibrium
(R, c) exists, it satisfies the following equations:
(11)  z(R)  = g(c)
and
(12)  (r -gc())R(Rc) -zR(R)(xc(R,  ) + au,()) = 0.
Our  first result  is  that the  steady-state  available  forage  is higher  in the  social
planner's problem than in the rancher's problem.  In order to show that this is the case,
we must consider how a change in the weighting assigned to the environmental  group's
utility affects the steady-state available forage. Recall that in the rancher's problem, the
1  We are assuming that the environmental  groups care about the state of the range.
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value of a is zero. Therefore, the sign of the derivative  dc/da is critical. By linearizing
equations (10) and (11), which describe the steady state, we get a system of equations
in the matrix form AdR = bda:
-ZR  gc  dR




Using Cramer's Rule, the derivative  dE/da is calculated as:
2
(14)  d  _CZR
da  det A
Assuming uc is sufficiently large,  we can sign the determinant of A as negative.  The
numerator,  -UCZ,  is negative, so  d/lda  must be positive.  Intuitively, this result says
that when the value of the available forage to the environmental groups is considered,
the optimal steady-state value of the available forage must increase. The reduction  in
the available forage caused by maximization of the rancher's private objective function
imposes an externality on environmental groups because the rancher only considers how
the change in the available forage affects profits. Similarly, the environmental group's
objective imposes an externality on the rancher because the environmentalists do not
consider the rancher's profits. If it is the case that the upper bound on the stocking rate
(Ru) imposed by the BLM's AUM  quota is so low that it is lower than the social opti-
mum, then adding risk of further reductions would only make society worse off.
The Rancher's Problem with Risk of Reform
In this problem, we assume that the rancher can affect the probability that reform will
occur over time through his/her choice of stocking rate. Accordingly, grazing reform is
an avoidable risk to the rancher. The random variable T is defined to be the time when
the reform occurs, and S(t) is defined  as the probability that no reform occurs in the
period [0,  t]. S(t) is a "survivor"  function, which is specified  to have the exponential
distribution 12parameterized by h. The complement of S(t) is F(t), which is then defined
as the probability that reform occurs by time t. By definition, F(t) = 1  - S(t). It is possible
to show that adding exogenous  uncertainty  of reform is equivalent to increasing the
discount rate by h (Clarke and Reed), where h is a conditional probability function that
can be expressed in terms ofF(t) and F'(t):
(15)  -h  - S  F  = prob.  of reform over next dt
S  1 - F  prob.  of no reform by t
12 The exponential distribution  is required for a steady state to exist.
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Here h is a hazard function, which can be interpreted as the conditional probability of
reform,  given that the reform has not yet occurred.  Reform is the "hazard" that the
rancher wants to avoid.
The probability of reform is a function of the available forage. The effect of environ-
mental  groups or  policy makers targeting ranchers  whose  stocking rates  cause  low
forage levels is represented by the following rule:
(16)  h(t)  = T(c(t)),
where
(17)  (0)  = 1,  (oo)  = 0,  T(c(t))  2 0,  '(c(t)) < 0.
Defining y as -ln(S),  T(c(t))  can be expressed  as  T(c(t))  =  y.  Following Kamien  and
Schwartz, the variable y is a state variable in the control problem. Expected profits can
be calculated as:
(18)  7  ro e -rt (R(t), c(t))dt} dF dr.
dr
Using F(O) =  0 and F(oo) =  1 from the  definition of an exponential  distribution,  and
1 - F(t) = S(t) = e -Y(t),  the expected profit can be expressed as:
f:  e-rty(t)(R(t), c(t)) dt,
and the resulting control problem is:
(19)  max f e-rt -(t)(R(t),  c(t)) dt,
R(t)  O
s.t.:  c  = -z(R(t))  +  g(c(t)),  c(O)  = Co,
y  = '(c(t)),  y(O)  = 0,
R(t)  < Ru.
The associated current-value  Hamiltonian is:
(20)  Hcv  = e -(t)T(R(t),  c(t))  + pl(-z(R(t))  +  g(c(t)))
+ ^2(T(c(t)))  +  3(Ru - R(t)).
The necessary  conditions for optimization are:
(21)  e -Y(t)(R(t),  c(t))  - ilzR(R(t))  = 0,
(22)  p3 2 0,  Ru - R(t) > 0,  ^3(Ru - R(t))  = 0,
(23)  ji,  = rup  - e -Y(t)c(R(t), c(t))  - llgc(C(t))  - 92Tc(C(t)),
(24)
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(25)  6 = -z(R(t))  +  g(c(t)),
(26)  )  = T(c(t)),
and
(27)  lim e-rt l,  c(t)  = lim e-rt2(t)y(t)  = 0.
t-00  t-00
If we define  P2 = e ,u2, we can write the necessary conditions for an interior solution as
three ordinary differential equations (ODEs) in R, c, and P2.  Setting these three ODEs
equal  to  zero  gives  us the  steady-state  values.  If an interior  solution  equilibrium
(R, c, P2) exists, the steady-state values are given by:
(28)  z(R)  = g(c),
(29)  [r +  (T)  - gc( )]R(R,  c)  - ZR(R )7C(R,  c)
ZR(R )IC(C)7(R,  c)
+  0,




r  + T()
Equation (28) is the requirement that in a steady state the reduction in forage due to
grazing equals the growth in forage. Equation (29) is the marginal condition. Equation
(30) requires that the probability of reform is constant in a steady state. The steady-
state level of the available forage,  c, is given by the solution to
ZR (Z  W(g( ))) 
1 c(E  )  (Z  (gC)),^  E
r  +  W(c)
while the steady-state level of the stocking rate, R, is given by
(32)  R  =  z-(gc)).
Equation (31) is derived from (28) and (29). Equation (32) is obtained from (28) and uses
the result that an inverse function for z(R(t)) exists because of the assumption that the
function z(R(t))  is monotonic in R(t).
Our  second result  is  that in comparison  with  the  corresponding  risk-free  state,
the interior solution steady-state available forage: (a) will be lower if the probability of
reform does not depend on the available  forage, and (b) will be higher if the probability
of reform decreases with an increase in the available forage, and the marginal proba-
bility of reform at the steady state, YJ(c), is sufficiently large in absolute value at the
steady state.
To  show that this result holds, we examine the steady-state equilibrium equations
that determine  available  forage  for both the avoidable  risk  and  no-risk cases.  The
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steady-state value of the available forage, c1, in the avoidable risk case satisfies (31), and
the steady-state  value of the available forage,  c0, in the no-risk case satisfies
(33)  (r  - gc(C))zR(Z  (g(c)), C)  - Zr(Z -(g(c)))  c (Z  (g(C)),  ) =0.
Given our assumptions, the left-hand side of (33) is increasing in c. It follows that c1will
be less than c0 if
Z R(Z  (g(Cl)),  1)  <  /c  (Cl1) (34)  -<
ZR(Z
-l (g(c)))(Z l(g(Cl))  C  1)  (Cl)(r 
+ T(C))
and c1 will be greater than c0 if
(35)  7TR(Z  (g( 1 C))  C)  >  >(c_  )
ZR(Z -(g( 1)))(Z  W(g(C 1)),  C1)  T(c1)(r  + T(c1))
In  the  static  profit-maximization  problem,  the  rancher  would  choose  R  so  that
R =  0.  However,  in the dynamic  problem  when the  change  in the available  forage
{c  = -z(R(t))  +  g(c(t))} is recognized,  the rancher will choose a time path of R(t) so that
7R  > 0.  Consequently,  the left-hand  sides  of both  equations (34) and (35)  are always
nonpositive. Equation (34) will hold when the probability of reform does not depend on
the available forage. In this instance, the marginal probability of reform,  c(C),  is equal
to zero. Equation (35) will hold if this marginal probability of reform is negative and
sufficiently large in absolute value.
Intuitively,  with the inclusion  of a hazard  function,  the rancher  cares  less  about
maintaining the forage for future use because grazing permits eventually may be lost.
The potential loss of grazing permits effectively increases the discounted future effect
and encourages the rancher to increase  stocking rates.  This is the only effect in the
unavoidable  risk  case.  The  increased  stocking  rates  lower  the  available  forage  by
equation (4).  As a result, in the case of unavoidable  risk of reform, the  steady-state
available forage will be lower than in the risk-free state. Therefore, in the steady state,
both the  available  forage  and the rancher's  stocking rate will be  lower than in the
corresponding risk-free state. Hence, with an unavoidable risk of reform under a steady
state in which  reform has not yet occurred,  both the rancher  and the environmental
groups are worse off than in the risk-free state.
This result highlights the discounted future effect and the avoidable risk effect that
are present  when  avoidable  risk is added to the problem.  The  avoidable  risk  effect
provides an incentive for the rancher to lower his/her stocking rate in order to reduce
the probability of grazing permit losses. The  avoidable risk effect  can offset the dis-
counted future effect that creates an incentive for the rancher to increase the stocking
rate. The second result is valid if the avoidable risk effect is sufficiently large to offset
the discounted  future effect.  If the marginal  decrease  in the probability  of reform is
small, then reducing the stocking rate will give the rancher little benefit in terms  of
reducing the probability of reform.  On the other hand, if the marginal decrease in the
probability of reform is large, then the rancher will benefit a great deal from a reduction
in stocking rate.
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If the solution is a boundary solution rather than an interior solution, the rancher
sets the stocking rate at R(t) = Ru. The effect  of this choice  on the available forage
compared with the  isk-free state depends on the magnitude of the quota relative to the
rancher's profit-maximizing rate in the risk-free state, and may also depend on both the
discounted future  effect and the avoidable risk effect.  If the quota is higher than the
rancher's profit-maximizing rate in the risk-free state, then part (a) of the second result
holds, but t  rancher is limited by the amount the stocking rate can be increased in
response to the incentives created by the discounted future effect.
In the second case, when the quota is lower than the rancher's profit-maximizing rate
in the risk-free  state, then in either the risk-free  state  or the risky state where  the
rancher is at the boundary solution, the stocking rate will equal the quota level. One
must keep in mind, however, that in many areas the monitoring by the agency charged
with  oversight  is  insufficient  to  ensure  that  ranchers  are not  stocking  above  the
permitted quota. Therefore, it may be profitable for a rancher to choose stocking rates
which  violate  the  quota.l3  This  is  a controversial  topic because  ranchers  may  feel
morally bound to respect the quota.
Our third result is that if the marginal probability of reform at the interior solution
steady state,  J(c), is sufficiently large in absolute value at the steady state, then the
steady-state  available  forage  can be  equivalent  to the socially  optimal  steady-state
available forage in the risk-free state. To show that this result is true, we assume that
the  effect  of environmental  groups  or  policy  makers  targeting  ranchers  with  low
available forage  for reform is embedded in the rule  h(t) = 6O(c(t)), where  0  2  0. Then
when 0 equals zero, we have the corresponding risk-free state. Including 0 in the control
problem gives us the steady-state values in (R, c)  determined by:
(36)  z(R)  = g(c),
(37)  [r + 0T(c)  - gc(e)]}R(R,  c)  zR(R)TC(R,  c)
zR(R)OT(c)n7c(R, c)
+  0.
r  + 0T(c)
Recall the equations describing the steady state for the social planner's problem:
(38)  z(R)  = g(c),
(39)  (r -gc())ZR(R,c)  zR(R)(c,(R,  ) + au,(c))= O.
Equations (36) and (38) are identical, while (37) and (39) have many terms in common.
Rearranging (37) and (39) so that their left-hand sides are identical yields:
(40)  [r -gc()]T,(R,  )  )-R(R)  - c(R,  )  = zR(R)au,(),
13  One  could  remove the  quota constraint  and add the probability  of detection  (given a violation  of the quota)  to this
problem.
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(41)  [r - gC()]CR(R,  c)  - ZR(R )cn(R,  c)
= - O( (Rc  z  )  R(R)OWTc(C)z(R,  c)
r  + Oe(c)
Therefore, to demonstrate that the steady-state forage can be equal to the socially opti-
mal level, we need to show that for any positive, finite a, there exists a 0 such that
zR(R )Oq'c(O)TE(R,  o)
(42)  ZR(R)auc(c)  = -OY(c)tR(R,  )  - RR) 1 C(  c)
r  + 0Y(0)
Solving for a in terms of 0 and the steady-state values gives
(43)  0  =  -[(ZRac +  Rr)Y  +  ZR'T]  +  [((ZRaU, + zRr)  O  +  ZRTcT)  - 4 
2 rzRaUcr]/2
which is a positive, real number if T  is sufficiently large in absolute value.  Therefore,
for any positive weighting between ranchers' profits and environmental groups' utility,
a policy  maker can determine  an appropriate  amount of avoidable  risk to  obtain a
socially optimal solution.
Given a model with externalities, the possibility of reform without avoidable risk can
be in the public's interest only if the reform is successful-that is, the reform limits the
activity. However,  it will not be the first-best outcome.  If activists are successful and
reform occurs, there will be increased stocking rates up until the time when the reform
is enacted.  The  first-best  outcome  limits stocking  rates  so that the  social  marginal
benefit  of the  activity  equals  the  social  marginal  cost.  An outright ban  of grazing
generally will not be  the first-best  outcome.  While this model focuses  on rangeland
reform,  it  could be applied to many possible reform situations in which the firm can
influence whether a reform will occur.
Conclusion
We have  shown that attempts at rangeland  reform can have two opposing effects  on
ranchers' incentives: (a)  the discounted future effect, which causes ranchers to increase
their stocking rates, and (b) the avoidable risk effect, which causes ranchers to decrease
their  stocking  rates.  Policy  makers  and  environmental  groups  have  ignored  the
avoidable  risk effect. The  bulk of rangeland  reform attempts have promoted  across-
the-board fee  increases, which  is an unavoidable  risk.  This increase in unavoidable
risk could explain the drop in the value of grazing permits  on public lands in recent
years.
To analyze the impact of the risk of reform, we presented a model of grazing on public
lands in which a rancher's choice of stocking rate creates an externality. We showed if
the probability of reform has an inverse relationship with the available forage, and the
marginal probability of reform at the steady state is sufficiently large, then in the steady
state the available forage is higher relative to the risk-free state. Also, if the marginal
probability of reform is sufficiently large in absolute value, policy makers can determine
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an appropriate amount of avoidable risk for ranchers  to obtain the first-best solution.
The BLM quotas serve as an upper bound on the stocking rate that ranchers can choose.
More generally, environmental activism can bring public and private interests into
alignment. For this to happen, environmental activism must link the quality of resource
in question  to  possible  consequences  such as  reform efforts,  litigation,  or  negative
publicity; in other words, the activism must create avoidable risk. In the case of grazing
on public lands, if activists call for across-the-board increases in grazing fees, there is
some probability that the increases will happen. However, if reform does not occur and
stocking  rates  increase,  then  forage  damage  will  be  magnified.  One  caveat  is that
targeting  specific  environmental  requirements  to  individual  land  parcels  will  be
expensive  and could be  perceived  as arbitrary  if they  depend  on the values  of local
government  officials.  In practice,  this  cost  must be  weighed  against  the  potential
benefits.
If policy makers and environmental groups can more directly target ranchers based
on the condition of the land, they benefit in two ways: there is still a probability that
reform will occur, and they cause ranchers to reduce their stocking rates (as opposed to
increasing their stocking rates, as is the case with across-the-board  reform). If range-
land reform is to be debated, it should be targeted based on some measure of damage.
Only then can public and private interests be aligned.
[Received  August 1998;  final revision received  January  1999.]
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